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NOTES
American Grand Jury:
Investigatory and Indictment Powers
N JULY 23, 1970, THE AKRON BEACON JOURNAL MADE PUBLIC

a United States Department of Justice summary of a 7,500 page
report compiled by a Federal Bureau of Investigation probe into the
shootings which had occurred at Kent State University on May 4,
1970.1 The report severely criticized the Ohio National Guard' find-'3
ing that the shootings "were not necessary and not in order."
Finally, the Justice Department summary interpreted information
gathered from interviews taken during the F.B.I. probe to indicate
that there was:
[S]ome reason to believe that the claim . . .that their
[the guardsmen's] lives were endangered by the students
was fabricated subsequent to the event.'
Two months later, on September 26, 1970, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, chaired by former Governor William W.
Scranton of Pennsylvania, communicated its findings concerning the
Kent State tragedy to President Nixon.' In its report, the Commission also criticised the Ohio National Guard and concluded that:
Even if the Guard had the authority to prohibit a
peaceful gathering- a question that is at least debatable
- the decision to disperse the noon rally [of May 4] was
a serious error ....
. . . [Tuhe Guard's decision to march through the
crowd . . . was highly questionable ....

1 Akron Beacon Journal, July 23, 1970, at 1 and 8.
2 NEWSWEEK, Oct. 26, 1970, at 25.
3NEwSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1970, at 14.
4
5

TIME,

Nov. 9, 1970, at 16.

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST iii
cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION],
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. . . The indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of
students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary,
unwarranted, and inexcusable.
Even if the guardsmen faced danger, it was not a danger
that called for lethal force. The 61 shots fired by 28 guardsmen certainly cannot be justified .... 6
The third and final report on the events which took place at
Kent State University was issued on October 16, 1970, by a special
Portage County, Ohio, grand jury? The grand jury was convened
at the order of the then Ohio Governor, James A. Rhodes,' who
had authorized the dispatching of the National Guard to Kent in
May.5 After twenty-seven days of deliberation, the grand jury released its findings and indicted twenty-five people for a total of
forty-three offenses.10 The fact that indictments were returned did
not shock the public who had watched the events for five months
following the Kent State tragedy. The surprise was rather in the
fact that the Portage County grand jury exonerated the Ohio Guard
as being essentially blameless 1 although the members of the grand
jury had available to them the reports compiled by both the F.B.I.
and the President's Commission on Campus Unrest. The twentyfive indictees included students and faculty members of Kent State
University, civilians not associated with the13 Kent State academic
community, but not one National Guardsman.
In its eighteen page report, the grand jury found that:
The gathering on the commons on May 4 .
ated into a riotous mob.

.

. degener-

* . . Those who acted as participants and agitators
are guilty of deliberate, criminal conduct ....

6

Id. at 288-89.

7 Akron Beacon Journal, Oct. 16, 1970, at 1 and 2; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nov.

2, 1970, at 33.

'U.S.

NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 2, 1970, at 32.

9 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra

note 5, at 247.

10NEWSWEEK, sapra note 2.
11NEWSWEEK, sapra note 2; NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1970, at 32.
12U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 7; TIME, supra note 4.

13NEWSWEEK, svpra note 2; NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1970, at 32; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT, sapra note 8; SATURDAY REVIEW, Dec. 19, 1970, at 58,
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It should be made clear that we do not condone all of
the activities of the National Guard on the Kent State
University Campus on May 4. We find, however, that those
members of the National Guard who were present on the
hill adjacent to Taylor Hall on May 4 fired their weapons
in the honest and sincere belief and under circumstances
which would have logically caused them to believe that they
would suffer serious bodily injury had they not done so.
They are not, therefore, subject to criminal prosecution
for any death or injury resulting therefrom.
[I]t is clear that from the time the Guard reached
the practice football field, they were on the defensive and
14
had every reason to be concerned for their own welfare.
As a result of the obvious discrepancies and conflicts among
the three reports concerning the Kent State incident, the U.S. Department of Justice was reported to have been considering whether
the convening of a federal grand jury was necessary)5 Additionally,
Robert I. White, President of Kent State University at the time of
the tragedy, 1' the Kent State faculty and student senates, and the
Kent State graduate-student council expressed a need for and requested the empaneling of a federal grand jury. To date, none has
been convened nor has there been any indication that one will be
called in the future,
Regardless of one's personal views as to which of the three
reports comes to the correct conclusions about the events which
took place at Kent State University, the fact remains that the Ohio
grand jury report contradicts the others. A federal grand jury
might alay those contradictions, but one has not been convened.
These considerations, then, raise a recurring issue wbich has been
debated within the legal and political communities for years: whether
or not the grand jury system in the United States is a viable institution within the framework of modern justice.
The History and Origin of the Grand Jury
A determination of the utility of the grand jury as it applies
to contemporary justice cannot be accomplished without first con-

supa note 8, at 34. The author was unable to obtain a
certified copy of the Portage County, Ohio, grand jury report, but excerpts from the official
text can be found in U.S. NEWS ANI WORLD REPORT, supra note 8, at 33-35, and Akron
Beacon Journal, suPra note 7.
15NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1970, at 33; SATURDAY REVIEW, Jutpra note 13.
16NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1970, at 32.
14U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,

17U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 7.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973

3

AMERICAN GRAND JURY

19731

sidering the original purposes and needs for which the grand jury
was established and whether or not those considerations still exist.
Although some evidence exists to suggest that elements of the jury
system, both petit and grand, may have come to England earlier,
it was undoubtedly introduced by the Norman kings.18 During the
period in which England was ruled by Henry II, 1154-1189, documentation indicates that the use of the jury system was extensive. 9
Henry II also made use of bodies called "assizes," 20 which were a
type of court that performed the functions of a jury, except that
verdicts issued therefrom were based upon investigation and personal knowledge of the jurors rather than adduced evidence.21 Holdsworth has stated that the use of the jury to present persons suspected of serious crime to officials of the king probably originated
from the Assize of Clarendon, which took place in 1166.22 At that
assize, it was provided that:
[F]or the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of justice enquiries be made throughout each county
and hundred by twelve legal men of the hundred and four
legal men from each township, under oath to tell the truth;
if in their hundred or their township there be any man who
is accused or generally suspected of being a robber or murderer or thief, or any man who is a receiver of robbers,
murderers or thieves since our lord the king was king.2 3
It has remained a popular notion to the present that the grand
jury, as it originated from the Assize of Clarendon, was developed
for the protection of individual rights. This tradition loses support,
however, by the fact that:
[Ilts sole function was to increase the power of the
Crown. An accusation by the Grand Assize [grand jury]
raised a presumption of guilt and trial by compurgation or
ordeal thereafter followed.
Eventually, as trial by ordeal or battle was abolished in the
thirteenth century, the grand jury not only continued to act in its

'81 HOLDSWORTH,

A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 313

(3d ed. 1922); 1 POLLOCK AND
cited in, Morse, A Survey of

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 143 (1903),
the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REV. 106 (1931).

MAITLAND,

191 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18; 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 18, at 144;

Morse, rupra note 18, at 107.
zi 1 I-IOLDSWORTH, supra note
2' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
221 HOLDSWORTH. supra note
231 1IOLDSWORTH, supra note

18, at 275; Morse, snpra note 18, at 107-08.
154 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
18, at 321; Morse, supra note 18, at 110.
18, at 77; Morse, supra note 18, at 110-

" Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U. ILL. L. E. 428-29
(1966), citing, BIGELOW, HisTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND 324 (1880); 1 HOLDSWORTH, .supranote 18, at 313.
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indicting capacity, but also became the trier of guilt and innocence.
Thus, at that time, the grand jury also functioned in a capacity
similar to the modern petit jury. In 1351-1352, however, statuatory
law was enacted in England which separated the roles of the grand
and petit juries by prohibiting grand jurors from being veniremen
on the trial jury.2
The true origin of the respect which the grand jury has maintained through the centuries as an institution that protected English
citizens from oppression and unfounded accusations of the Crown27
can be traced back to the 1681 case of the Earl of Shaftesbury
Trial.-" In that case, charges of treason had been lodged by Charles
II against the Earl of Shaftesbury.29 The Crown insisted that the
grand jury hear testimony in open court, whereupon the jury refused. Following the testimony of witnesses behind closed doors, the
grand jury declined to indict--much to Charles' chagrin. 3 From
this point on the grand jury ceased to exist as an exclusive tool of
the Crown.
Finally, when the colonization of the North American continent
took place during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries, the
English brought the grand jury system with them.31 It was their
belief that the same conditions and considerations which made the
grand jury a necessary institution in Britain also applied to the
colonies in the New World. 2
The American Grand Jury
The grand jury system became firmly rooted in American
criminal procedure when, on December 15, 1791, the several states
of the United States of America completed ratification of the Bill
of Rights." The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides in part that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentation or indict25Calkins, sepia note 24, at 429, citing, BIGELow, supra note 24, at 316-17, and, WALSH,
A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERIcAN LAW 300-02 (2d ed. 1932).
26I HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 325; Morse, sepra note 18, at 114; see, Calkins, supira
note 24, at 429.

2State v. Iosue, 220 Minn. 283, 19 N.W.2d 735 (1945).
3

SYOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-

1941, at 2 (1963).
29 1d.

3 Calikins, jpra note 24, at 429. Calklns also cites a second case at 429 n. 29, "for the
meritorious action of the grand jury in withstanding the strongest possible pressure from
the Crown." Trial of Stephen Colledge for High Treason, 8 Howell State Trials 550

(1816).

31YOUNGER, supia note 28, at 2.

32State v. Iosue, 220 Minn. 283, 19 N.W.2d 735 (1945).
33THE CONSTITUTION OF THIE UNITED STATES OF AMERcA, H.R. DOC. No. 92-157, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972).
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ment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger. ....
This provision remains part of the Constitution to date and no
attempt at revision regarding it has been proposed. Similar articles
have also been included in the constitutions of various states. The
Ohio Constitution, for example, employs language identical to its
federal counterpart, except that a grand jury indictment is also not
specifically required in cases of impeachment, nor those involving
"offenses for which the penalty provided is less than imprisonment
in the penitentiary ... .
While our Founding Fathers undoubtedly believed that England
was enlightened in devising the "Grand Inquest," such esteem for
this decision has not weathered the centuries. England abolished the
grand jury in 193336 and replaced it with a mandatory preliminary
hearing. 37 With but a few exceptions, both the federal government
and the individual states have not followed this example. As of
1966, twenty-one states required that felony prosecutions be initiated
by grand jury indictment alone."
It was held by the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Hurtado v. California," that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution did not require the states
to retain or employ the grand jury method of initiating criminal
prosecutions. As a result, twenty-two states by 1966 permitted the
initiation of felony prosecutions by either the grand jury indictment or the prosecuting attorney's information. 0 A small number
of other states, at that time, also allowed the use of the information
41
where prosecution by indictment was waived by the accused. Such
42
is the present situation in Ohio. Waiver by the defendant has even
by
been adopted in federal cases where the accused may be punished
43
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor.

4

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
35OHIO CONST. art. I,§ 10 (1851). See, ILL. CONST. art. I 1 7 (1970); PA. CONST. art.
I, § 10 (1968); KY. CONST. § 12 (1891).
36
KARLEN, ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTlCe
at 428, citing, PLUNKETT,

A

149 (1967);

Calkins, supa note 24,

CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 112 n.1

(5th

ed. 1956).
3 KARLEN, supra note 36, at 143-46.

3 Calkins, supra note 24, at 424 n.6.

19110 U.S. 516 (1884).
'* Calkins, supra note 24, at 424 n.6.
41Id.
4201O REV. CODE § 2941.021 (Page's Supp. 1971).

4213 U.S.C. §§ 3361-62 (1970); FED, 1. CsIM, P. 7 (a) -(b).
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In addition to its responsibility of bringing to trial those individuals charged with a crime, the American grand jury has been
charged with the duty to protect innocent citizens from unfounded

accusations" as had its English counterpart prior to 1933. A third
duty, however, has also been imputed to the American grand jurythe reporting to the citizenry of the county or district within which
it has been impaneled, any information regarding the dereliction of
public officials or figures of public interest, and unwholesome situations which exist within the community.45 For example, Title 18,
Section 3333 of the United States Code permits a special grand
jury which has been impaneled by any district court to submit to
that court a report:
[C]onccrning noncriminal misconduct, malfeasance, or
misfeasance in office involving organized criminal activity
by an appointed public officer or employee as the basis for
a recommendation of removal or disciplinary action ....
Instances of similar responsibilities on the state level include California Penal Codc Sections 914.1 and 925 which have been reported
to require country grand juries to investigate county government
offices routinely, without any suspicion or knowledge of criminal conduct or irregularities."
A determination, then, as to whether or not the modern grand
jury remains a viable institution must necessarily consider whether
the functions and duties of making criminal presentments, protecting innocent citizens from unfounded accusations, and conducting
investigations are being performed and met. Furthermore, even if
such aims are being accomplished, are they being achieved efficiently,
or could they be arrived at more effectively by an alternative institution or procedure?

"4Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906);

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); In Re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N.Y.S.

275 (2d Dept.), appeal dismissed, 181 N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226 (1905).
Ryon v. Shaw, 77 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1955); Application of Quinn, 5 Misc.2d 466, 166
N.Y.S.2d 418 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1957); In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury,

45

34 N.J. 378, 169 A.2d 465 (1961); In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury,
10 N.J. 23, 89 A.2d 416 (1952). Cf., Iv Re Morse, 42 Misc. 664, 87 N.Y.S. 721 (Ct.
Gen. Sess. 1904); Petition of McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936).
4618 U.S.C. § 3333 (1970). It should be noted that the previous two code sections, 3331
and 3332, authorize the impaneling of special federal grand juries. See, 18 U.S.C. § 3057
(1970), which provides for grand jury investigations regarding illicit activities relating to
bankruptcies, insolvent debtors, receiverships, and corporate reorganization plans.
4 Dummit, Investigatory Powers of California Grand Jury, 46 (CALIF.) ST. B. J. 467, 472

(1971).
Ohio also grants investigatory powers to its grand juries, but of a more specific nature.
Otto REV. CoDE § 701.03 (Baldwin 1971) gives county grand juries authority to visit
and inspect any of the benevolent or correctional institutions established by a municipal
corporation, and to examine the books and accounts thereof. OHIo Rev. CODE § 2921.15
(Continued on next page)
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The Grand Jury Indictment Should be Abolished and Replaced
by the Prosecutor's Information
As its lineage would indicate, the function of the grand jury to
present criminal indictments to the court when the evidence merits
such action, is inexorably tied to its role as the protector of individual civil rights and liberties. This conclusion logically follows
since an accused cannot be protected from unfounded accusations
and oppression unless he has first been accused of some criminal or
undesirable behavior. These two responsibilities will be considered
as a unified entity.
While it has been contended by some that abolition of the grand
jury indictment and use of the prosecutor's information solely in its
place would grant an excessive amount of power to the county
prosecutor or the U.S. attorney,9 retention of the indictment would
still prove ineffective in protecting the rights of an alleged criminal,
unless the grand jury actually acts independently of the prosecutor.,
In 1931, U.S. Senator Wayne L. Morse, then Associate Professor of
Law at the University of Oregon, conducted an extensive "Survey
of the Grand Jury System."" Statistical data from 7,414 cases
reported by 162 prosecuting attorneys representing twenty-one
states was gathered, collated, and analyzed. 52 Of the total number
of cases considered, 95.24% (7,061) were presented to the grand
jury through the prosecutor's office; only 4.76% (353) of the cases
were commenced on the initiative of the grand jury itself." From
this data, Professor Morse concluded that "grand juries do not tend
to function independently [of the prosecutor]."m

(Continued from preceding page)
(Page 1954) authorizes the convening of a special county grand jury to investigate any
conspiracy to defraud the state. OHIO REV. CODE § 2939.21 (Page 1954) requires county

once during each term for the purpose of eicamining their
grand juries to visit county jails
condition and inquiring into the discipline and treatment of the prisoners. Finally, OHIO
REv. CODE § 2939.17 (Page's Supp. 1971) empowers the Governor or General Assembly
to order the initiation of any investigation by means of a special country grand jury. Such
authority employed by Governor Rhodes to convene the special
was probably the statutory
Portage County grand jury which inquired into the Kent State incident.

"Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attak, 46 J. CalM. L.C. & P.S. 214 (1955).
50Note, Should the Grand Jury Indictment Be Abolisked in Illinois?, 2 JOHN MARSHALL
oF PRAC. AND PRoc.348 (1969); Calking, upra note 24, at 431.
'Morse, supra note 18, (pts. 1-3), 101, 217, 295.

J.

55

ld. at 123.
s1Id.at 134.
HId.at 362.
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It may be argued and even granted that Morse's data is fortyone years old and, therefore, invalid, but recent sources55 can be
found which support his conclusion, Canfield quotes an ex-prosecuting attorney as follows:
Almost without exception grand jurors know only the
facts of the ease that the state's attorney chooses to present,
and almost invariably grand jurors follow the wishes of the
prosecutor as to who shall be indicted and who shall not be
indicted. In fact, it is now quite safe to say that the reliability of the grand jury runs just about parallel with the
reliability of the state's attorney. This is not a criticism of
either jurors or prosecutors and is not an attempt to indicate anything but a sincere effort on the part of either, but
if the state's attorney is to so much govern the grand jury,
why not let him exercise his discretion quickly by means of
56
an information.
Other data from the Morse survey discredits the concept that
the grand jury protects individuals from governmental oppression.
Morse reported that the grand jury returned "no true bills," i.e.,
lack of probable cause, in 16.57% (1,170) of the prosecutor initiated
cases?' However, an even greater percentage of the cases commenced
5
by the grand jury itself, 20.40% (72), received "no true bills."
Thus, of the 7,414 total cases considered, the grand jury refused to
indict in 16.75% (1,242) of them. Commenting on these statistics,
Morse stated that:
[I]t can be inferred that prosecutors are not more
likely to initiate investigations of cases which should be
"no true billed" than are the grand juries themselves.5 9
Again, since the Morse data can be criticized as being dated,
the reader is asked to consider the figures set down in Tables I and
II below. Table I lists the number and percentage of no bills returned by grand juries from five selected counties of New York
State and from the entire state during the period from July 1,

55Sa e.g., Antell, The Modern GrandJuiry: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A. J. 154-55
(1965); Lombard, The Criminal Justice Revolution and the Grand Jury, 39 N.Y_ ST_ B.J.
397, 399 (1967). Cf., Gelber, The Grand Jury Looks at Itself, 45 FLA. BJ. 577 (1971).

Former grand jurors from eleven Florida counties who served from 1964-66 and 1967-70

were asked if they believed that the state's attorney exercised too much influence over grand

jury action. 43% of those jurors polled answered in the affirmative. While a majority of
the jurors believed that they acted independently during their tenure, itis significant that
close to one-half of them personally believed that they had not.
56Canfield, Have We Outgrown the Grand Jury?, 40 ILL. .J.209 (1951), cited in, Calkins,
supra note 24, at 431,
57Morse, supra note 18, at 145.
5 Id. at 140.
59Id. at 146.
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0
Table II contains similar infor1963 to June 30, 1964, inclusive
Ohio, for the years
(Cleveland),
mation from Cuyahoga County
1970 and 1971.61

TABLE

I:

Percentage of No Bills Returned in New York State from
July 1, 1963 to June 30, 1964.
Total Defendants

No Bills

Percentage of
No Bills

Considered

Returned

Returned

2,116
6,200
5,198
2,030
427
27,436

176
767
627
400
76
3,476

8.32
12.37
12.06
19.70
17.80
12.67

County

Bronx
New York
Kings
Queens
Richmond
New York (state)
TABLE II:

Percentage of No Bills Returned in Cuyahoga County
(Cleveland), Ohio, During 1970 and 1971.
Percentage of

Year

Total Cases Filed
With Grand Jury

No Bills
Returned

No Bills
Returned

1970
1971

4,151
4,280

305
238

7.35
5.39

While the figures contained in Tables I and II make no distinction
between cases initiated through the prosecutor's office and those
commenced by the unilateral action of the grand jury, numerous
contemporary sources indicate that grand juries commence comparatively few cases on their own initiative."
The statistics contained in Table I generally show that in New
York, during the year 1963-64, 12.67% no bills were returned
throughout the state. Table II indicates that for the calendar years
of 1970 and 1971, the Cuyahoga County, Ohio, grand jury refused
to indict in an average of 6.37% of the cases which it took under
consideration. These figures are clearly not in excess of the 16.75%
total "no true bills" reported by Morse, and demonstrate that the
trend observed in 1931 has continued to the present. If anything, the
percentage of no bills has decreased, and one might conclude from
this that the general quality of cases presented to the grand jury
by the prosecutor has improved markedly from 1931 to 1972. Thus,
as Morse pointed out:
6010 N.Y. ADMIN. BD. OF THE JUD. CONF. ANN. REP., LEG. Doc. NO. 90, Table 31, 417

(19G5), cited in, Note, An Examination of the Grand Jury in New York, 2 COLUM. J.
oF L. & Soc. PRO. 99 (1966).

61OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CUYAIOGA COUNTY, OHIO,

1970 and 1971 YEARLY REPORTS.
12See ?.g., MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME

9-10 (1969), and, Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of the Advantages in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1166-72 (1960), cited in MILLER el 4, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION AND RELATED PROCESSES 533-40 (1971).
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The statistics . . . show that there is little difference

between the opinions of the prosecutors and the grand juries
as to what should be done with the cases. It would, therefore, seem to follow that they agree as to who are innocent
persons. Thus, if the honesty and integrity of our prosecutors ...

can be relied upon, it would seem to follow from

these statistics that innocent persons would be as well protected under the information method as under the indictment method.6 3
It might be contended that one of the major difficulties which
exists in Morse's evaluation of the data and the conclusions which
he reaches therefrom lies in his reliance upon the continued honesty
and integrity of the prosecutor's office. That is, if the indictment
were abolished and replaced solely by the prosecutor's information,
the danger might exist of improperly prepared cases and abuse of
4
presentment power.6
This argument can be challenged on two grounds. First, abolition of the indictment does not necessarily include dissolution of
the grand jury itself. The grand jury could continue in its investigatory capacity, and in so doing, make the prosecutor's office subject
to periodic inspection and review. As previously noted, grand jury
review of county offices is already authorized in some states, and
this power could be used to place the necessary checks and balances
upon a prosecutor's office which would have sole responsibility for
the presentment of persons accused of criminal conduct. Second,
only an amount of evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case
against the accused is heard by the grand jury at an inquest.6 It is,
therefore, doubtful that cases are completely prepared by the time
they are presented to the grand jury, and that without any additional preparation, the prosecutor could go directly from the jury's
chambers into court and try the case.
The subject of a prima facie case and the evidence required to
secure an indictment raises another criticism regarding the retention of the indictment-the absence of due process during jury
proceedings. 6 The grand jury is merely an informing body rather
than a judicial proceeding in the strict sense that the latter requires
procedural due process.6 As a result, inquiries made by the grand
jury are conducted on an informal basis, ind do not adhere to the
63 Morse, supra note 18, at 154.

supra note 55, at 400.
Calkins, supra note 24, at 432.
66It was held in the case of Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), that the only
due process required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution regarding grand juries is that the jury be unbiased and constituted according to law.

6Lumbard,
61

67In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953).
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rules of evidence. 68 Furthermore, the accused, who is being investigated at a grand jury hearing, is not permitted to be represented
by counsel," does not have the right to present evidence favorable
to his case, and may not cross-examine witnesses who have been
presented by the prosecutor as his incriminators,'1
It is particularly notable that the rules of evidence are held in
abeyance during grand jury proceedings; it is entirely possible to
have an indictment based solely upon hearsay evidence.72 One witness before a grand jury was reportedly told, "The grand jury is
entitled to your speculation."" (emphasis supplied).
Indeed, a grim picture of due process in the grand jury chambers is painted by Nitschke who states:
[T]he witness must walk into the grand jury room
alone facing, in the secrecy of those chambers, the questions
of the prosecutor and grand juror without the protection
afforded by counsel or by the presence of the court. Without the help of his lawyer the witness may be led into the
discussions of privileged communications or into admissions
which he would not have made if he had been refreshed on
the basis of all the facts. He cannot object to questions that
are leading, double-edged or otherwise improper in form.
Only parts of documents, or only one document of a series,
may be shown to him. He cannot demand that he be allowed
to explain or to controvert facts brought out before the
grand jury. He may not be cross-examined to bring out full
and complete facts.

In these circumstances, the average individual testifies
under considerable mental stress. He may forget facts that
under more favorable circumstances he would readily recall.
Through suggestions of the prosecutor and grand jurors he
"recalls" matters of which he actually has no knowledge.
He gives incomplete answers. He may tend to tell the grand
jurors what he believes they wish to hear. To relieve the

68See, Foster, Grand Jery Practice in the 1970's, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 701 (1971).

"United

(1955).

States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897

0 Id.
71United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971

(6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 958
(1969), rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113
denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
(2d Cir. 1955), cert.
2White, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. REv. 461, 488 (1959).
7 Foster, upra note 69, at 703.
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pressures upon himself he may make irrelevant accusations
about the conduct of third persons . .

..

In summing up the injustices caused by the grand jury's nature
of being devoid of due process, Foster states that:
Unfounded speculation can lead only to misunderstanding; it can never advance the pursuit of truth. Honest and
meaningful testimony is most likely to emerge when a proper
foundation is laid, when a witness is asked a comprehensible
question, and when adversary counsel are present to object
to improper implications, conclusions, and assumptions of
fact not in evidence. The features which make the adversary
trial a viable social institution are utterly and intolerably
lacking from the grand jury process.7 5
Those who desire to preserve the indictment and maintain that
the grand jury protects both the accused and the witnesses who
appear before it from unfounded accusations, defamation, and harassment point to the secrecy in which its proceedings are cloaked
as further justification for the continuation of prosecution by indictment.76 The reasons which justify such secrecy have been stated as
(1) to prevent the escape of those who may be indicted, (2) to
insure that the grand jurors are not harassed during their deliberations, (3) to encourage the voluntary disclosure of evidence, through
testimony, by witnesses, (4) to prevent the defamation of an accused
who might be subsequently found to be not culpable for any criminal
activity, and (5) to prevent the possible tampering with witnesses. 7
All of these reasons which support the proposition that grand
jury proceedings should be secret can be rebutted. The counterarguments, however, require a working knowledge of the steps
which preceed the returning of an indictment by the grand jury.
Thus, it is necessary to briefly outline these steps. In order to secure
an indictment against an alleged criminal, five steps are generally
followed: first, a complaint is filed before a magistrate; second, the
magistrate determines whether there is probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed through some criminal agency,
possibly the accused; third, if probable cause is found to be present,
the accused is held in custody or granted bail pending action by the
grand jury; fourth, the prosecutor prepares the case and presents
Nitschke, Reflections on Some Evils of Expanding Use of the Grand Juy Transcript, 37
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 198, 203-05 (1968), cited in Foster, rupra note 68, at 701.
7SFoster, supra note 68 at 716-17.
76 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1970) makes it unlawful for anyone, who is not a grand juror, to listen
to or to observe the proceedings of a federal grand jury, or to attempt to do either, while
the jury is deliberating or voting.
7 United States v, Badger Paper Mills, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Wis. 1965), cited in
Note, Examination of the Grand Jury, supra note 60, at 103.
74
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it to the grand jury, and fifth, if a prima facie case is made out
during the inquest, the grand jury binds the defendant over for
trial by returning a true bill or indictment."
The arguments that can be advanced in opposition to the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings may be stated as follows: (1)
Escape of accused- the escape of an alleged criminal who may be
indicted will not necessarily be prevented by the secrecy of grand
jury proceedings since, in most cases, he has already been arrested
and has appeared at a preliminary hearing. He has either been
released on bond or imprisoned before the grand jury's deliberations
commence. 9 (2) Harassment of grand jurors-strict laws have
0
been enacted to prevent the harassment of grand jurors." (3) Voluntary disclosure of evidence- any reluctance that a prospective
witness might have in testifying of his own volition before a grand
jury should really not be dispelled by secret proceedings. The witness
must realize that any testimony or evidence which he contributes
to the case will eventually be made public at trial. (4) Defamation
of accused- the good name of the accused will not, in the majority
of cases, be protected by secret proceedings since, as was seen previously, most cases presented to the grand jury generally result in
true bills. Thus, while the accused may have an excellent defense
at trial and be subsequently acquitted, he must, nevertheless, bear
the social stigma of having been indicted. 62 (5) Tampering with
witnesses--once a witness for the prosecution testifies at a preliminary hearing, the accused will know the substance of the prima
facie case against him. Furthermore, since the defendant can obtain
a pre-trial list of all the witnesses to be presented against him, it
is, therefore, a simple matter to approach these witnesses. Secret
grand jury proceedings will not prohibit tampering3 with the witnesses, if the defendant is adamant about doing so.6
Calkins states that there is still another more compelling reason
to oppose the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. He contends that
the element of "surprise" is fostered by secrecy, and that such an
element has no place in a criminal trial.U
Secrecy places a premium on the element of surprise
for in many instances the defense, because of very restrictive rules of pretrial discovery in criminal cases, will have

72Antel, supra note 55, at 154.

Calkins, supra note 24, at 435.
"0See e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1504 (1970).
81Calkins, supra note 24, at 434.
"1

82 Id. at 433.

8B
Id. at 434.
U Id,

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss1/11

14

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:136

little understanding of the State's case until it unfolds at
trial .... 85

Thus, as Traynor concludes, "The truth is most likely to emerge
[only] when each side seeks to take the other by reason rather than
surprise." 86
Connected very closely with the cloak of secrecy that surrounds
grand jury proceedings is the jury's authority to issue compulsory
process. All state 7 and federal8 grand juries have the power to
subpoena witnesses who will not come forward willingly. If used, this
power provides considerable assistance to the prosecutor in the collection of evidence." Opponents view this power as a "clear evasion
of the law,"9 0 on the grounds that it has been misued. Tigar and
Levy contend that some grand juries continue in session after indictments have been returned, solely for the purpose of granting
government attorneys compulsory process in obtaining pre-trial discovery. Such discovery, they claim, is explicitly forbidden by rules
15 and 16 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." Again,
instead of protecting the rights of the innocent accused, the grand
jury indictment perpetrates the exact opposite.
A final consideration to be examined regarding the merits of
either retaining or abolishing the grand jury indictment is the time
element involved in the administration of criminal justice. It is
common knowledge that justice for the alleged criminal is served
at a relatively slow pace in this, the age of computerized speed. Recalling to mind the five step procedure for bringing an accused to
trial that was outlined above, it should be readily apparent that
the abolition of the indictment would eliminate two of those steps
entirely. Any alternative to the indictment which would facilitate
the more timely disposition of cases, then, should be seriously considered, provided that the civil rights of the accused are not curtailed or limited. Other considerations presented in this work have
endeavored to demonstrate that the rights of the accused would be
equally as well protected, if not more so, under the prosecutor's
information. Furthermore, if the prosecutor's information were to

8

1ld. at 434-35.

'6Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228, 249
(1964), cited in, Calkins, supra note 24, at 435.
87
E.g., OHio REV. CODE § 2939.12 (Page 1954).
tt
See, FD.R. CtIi. P. 17(a); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966), citing
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950), and, Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610
(1960).
Lumbard, supra note 55, at 401-02.
' Tigar and Levy, The Grand Jury as the New Inquisition, 50 MICH. ST. B.J. 693, 700
tt

5

(1971).
td. Rule 15 gives only defendants the right to take depositions to perpetuate testimony, and
rule 16(c) severely limits
the right of government attorneys
to discovery.
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replace the indictment and follow a mandatory preliminary hearing
such as the one presently employed in England, the two steps of the
charging process now occupied by the indictment would not only
be eliminated, but no others would be needed to replace them. The
prosecutor's information would merely exist as an ancillary procedure to the preliminary hearing.
It can be contended that the indictment procedure takes only a
negligible amount of time. Even granting that, it is indisputable
that a small amount of much needed time would be saved. In this
manner, criminal procedure would operate more fully to safeguard
the accused's constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy and
public trial."
The Investigatory Powers of the Grand Jury Should be
Retained and Intensified
It has been shown 3 that the American grand jury possesses
investigatory powers independent of its role as the accuser of alleged criminals. The consideration of whether these powers should
be continued as they now exist, increased, or abolished altogether
depends in a large sense upon the choice of alternative institutions
which might be employed to replace the grand jury in its investigative capacity.
The just and efficient operation of our government relies upon
the intricate system of checks and balances which exists among the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches as outlined in the Constitution of the United States. As the grand jury is presently established, it functions as an appendage of, and has no existence apart
from, the court which it attends. The grand jury does not become an
independent body after being summoned, impaneled, and sworn-in. 9
This principle is important, because insofar as it participates in the
system of checks and balances, the grand jury must be considered
judicial in nature. Thus, from a theoretical standpoint, any institution which might be proposed as an alternative to the grand jury
should also be judicial in nature.
From a purely pragmatic, rather than theoretical, point of view,
one might query why a system of checks and balances is needed at
the grass-roots, investigative level. The same question may also be
restated in another manner. If the investigatory powers of the grand
jury were eliminated, would it be essential that the alternative institution or procedure which replaces them be judicial in nature, or

12U.S. CoNSr, amend VI.

"See text at notes 44-48 supra.
"in re National Window Glass Workers, 287 F. 219 (D.C. Ohio 1922), cited in, Gold,
Limitations on the Powers of Federal Grand juries, 23 PA. B.A. Q. 48, 50-51 (1951).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss1/11

16

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:136

would replacement itself be essential? Investigations carried out
by the executive and legislative branches of the government have
completely different purposes and designs from those conducted by
a quasi-judicial body such as the grand jury. Executive investigations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation probe following
the Kent State tragedy" are merely intended to determine whether
a particular law has been violated. Legislative investigations such
as Congressional or city council committee hearings are designed to
gain input into the lawmaking process. Judicial inquiries as characterized by grand jury investigations are intended to serve two
purposes, depending upon whether or not the power of indictment
is retained. If the indictment has not been abolished, the grand jury
investigation must consider the facts of a case presented to it and
96
determine whether an established law, on its face, has been violated.
In the second instance where there exists no power to indict, the
grand jury would essentially act as a public watchdog and informant
to the community concerning matters of public concern such as the
efficient operation of the government. In neither case is the grand
jury designed to enforce laws in a vacuum nor acquire the information needed to write new ones as are executive departments and
legislative bodies.
Another consideration delineates grand jury inquiries from
and discrimination.
executive and legislative investigations -bias
Of their very nature, the executive and legislative arms of government are politically biased. It necessarily follows that investigations
conducted by them are subject to some amount of political influence.
The judiciary, on the oLher hand, is generally viewed as being
apolitical in nature, and this same quality can be imputed to grand
juries since they are appendages of the courts.97 This consideration
of having an unbiased grand jury has been seen as being so essential
that many of the states 8 along with the federal government" have
established guidelines to assure the impartial selection of jurors.
The United States Supreme Court has also spoken on this theme by
holding that the Constitution requires an affirmative duty on the

15

See text at notes 1-4 sra.

96This function of the grand jury investigation is admittedly very dose to the mere enforce-

ment of the law as performed by the executive branch of government. It is for this reason
that numerous arguments favoring abolition of the grand jury indictment were presented
in the previous section of this work.
97Lumbard, supra note 55, at 400.
93E.g., OHIO Rev. CODE § 2939.02 provides that only the grand jury foreman may be hand
picked by judges of the common pleas court. All other jurors must be chosen randomly
from a list of qualified electors whose names have been placed in a jury wheel or automated data processing device.
9928 U.S.C. § 1863 (1970) requires each United States District Court to devise and make
operational a written plan for random jury selection.
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part of jury selectors to pursue a method of selection which operates
devoid of any discrimination."'
A final reason which supports the retention of the grand jury
investigation is the possible abolition of the indictment. As pointed
out previously,' a method of maintaining the integrity of the prosecutor's office is required if the prosecutor's information becomes
the sole procedure for initiating criminal presentments. Along with
other investigative functions such as inquiring into the conditions
2
and operation of penal institutions, 10 the grand jury could routinely
make similar inquiries into the prosecutor's office.
If one concludes that the grand jury should retain its investigatory powers, it logically follows that the extent of those powers
must also be considered. In some states such as Ohio, it has been
held that the grand jury may not act in an advisory capacity or
review the conduct of public authorities, boards, officers, or commis15
for exsioners.NO Other states, New York"' and Pennsylvania
ample, permit investigations into public matters, but only when it
is probable that some criminal activity is involved. A third approach
is taken by California, which permits routine investigation of public
106
offices even where a hint of criminal conduct does not exist.
Indeed, the investigatory powers of the grand jury runs the
full gamut of authority among the states. If the grand jury, however, is to serve the community in its fullest capacity and participate
completely in the system of check and balances, the purview of its
107
inquiry must ultimately be expanded.
Intensification of the jury's powers of investigation, however,
presents additional difficulties. Grand jury inquiries cannot diligently
examine the operations of governmental agencies and offices unless
the knowledge and expertise of the jurors are equal to the task in
these matters. As Antell implies, there can be no special merits:
In confiding these important responsibilities to a group
of citizens who are completely untrained in the work they

"' 5Glasser v- United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217
(1946); cited in, Comment, El Chicano Y the Conititltion: The Legacy of Hernandez
Grand Jury Discrimination, 6 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 129, 139A0 (1971).
10, See text following note 64 supra.
102See note 48 supra.
03State v. Robinette, 2 Ohio Op.2d 215, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 181, 143 N.E.2d 186 (C.P. Pike
County 1957).
104ln re Morse, 42 misc. 664, 87 N.Y.S. 721 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1904).
115
Petition of McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936).
116See text at notes 47 and 48 spra.
107Cf., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407
(1920); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895); cited in, Dunmit, supra note
47, at469.
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have to do and whose only qualification for service is that
they can see and hear and have resided for a prescribed
time in the jurisdiction where they have been called for
service.108
Additionally, the fact that grand juries must ultimately depend upon
the state's attorney and his staff to do the investigative field work
seriously hinders the completeness and effectiveness of grand jury
investigations. 109 This is especially true when one considers that the
primary interest of the prosecutor lies in the area of criminal
prosecutions.
A survey of grand jurors which was conducted in Florida provides viable solutions to these problems. A questionnaire was submitted to 210 former grand jurors from eleven Florida counties who
served during the 1964-66 and 1967-70 terms. Among others questions, the following two were posed. "Would better caliber jurors
be obtained if they were selected from a 'blue ribbon list," and
"Should the jury be able to employ its own investigators rather than
be limited to the investigative staff provided by the police or the
prosecutor?"11 0 On a statewide basis, 66% of the jurors voted affirmatively on both issues. The results of the Dade County (Miami)
poll showed a significantly higher percentage of affirmative responses
than those from other less populated counties. Regarding the first
issue, Dade County jurors supported selection of jurors from a restricted rather than general panel of citizens by a margin of 89%.
84% of the Dade County jurors were also in favor of an independent investigative staff. "1 Thus, a truly effective grand jury
investigation can be attained, at least in the eyes of grand jurors
themselves, if individual juror qualifications are upgraded and an
independent research staff is provided.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The historical origin of the grand jury dates to Twelfth Century
England. As it developed there, the dual role of the grand jury as
accuser of alleged criminals and protector of individual rights and
liberties evolved. However, upon examination of the contemporary
American grand jury, it can be seen that these historical roles have
not been fulfilled in many instances. Furthermore, in those cases

108Antell, snpra note 55, at 154.
109

The Grand Jury System in Massachusetts: A Survey, 2 SUFFOLK U. L. RaV. 201,
etat,
Elias
205 (1968), citing, Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body of Public Oficials,

10 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 219, 231 (1936).
"'Gelber, supra note 55, at 577.
III Id.
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where the grand jury has functioned satisfactorily in its historical
capacity, similar results could have been achieved in a more practicable manner by other means- most notably the prosecutor's
information.
Specifically, this examination of the grand jury system demonstrates that: (1) grand juries do not act independently of the prosecutor; (2) prosecutors initiate cases of at least the same or better
merit than those commenced by grand juries themselves; (3) the
quality of cases presented by the prosecutor would not decrease if
the indictment were abolished; (4) the facets of due process present
in a purely judicial proceeding which guard and protect the rights
of the accused are absent from grand jury proceedings, and (5) the
speedy administration of criminal justice as guaranteed by the Constitution is delayed by prosecution via the indictment.
It is concluded and recommended, therefore, that the grand jury
indictment be abolished in all cases, both federal and state, and
replaced by a uniform preliminary hearing followed by the prosecutor's information. The author realizes that this proposal may
require constitutional revision by the federal and many state governments, which, although being a formidable obstacle to abolition,
should not be considered an insurmountable one or used as an additional justification for retention of the grand jury indictment.
While it is recommended that the indictment be abolished, it is
not suggested that the grand jury itself be dissolved. It has been
outlined that the American tri-partite form of government requires
the existence of a quasi-judicial investigatory body. The grand jury
serves this purpose. Additionally, should the indictment be abolished,
the investigatory powers of the grand jury should be retained and
expanded for two reasons. One, a device or procedure will be necessary to maintain the integrity of the prosecutor's office which would
then have sole power to present alleged criminals to the courts. Two,
no longer acting as indictor, the grand jury in many states would
require extended power to inquire routinely into the operation of
governmental offices and agencies. The authority to investigate
special circumstances on an ad hoe basis, such as the Kent State
tragedy, should also be retained and enlarged. In any investigation,
however, the grand jury would only act as an inquisitory body
whose findings would then be passed onto the state's attorney. In
this fashion, then, the prosecutor would remain as the sole initiator
of criminal prosecutions.
The Kent State incident is illustrative of the new role that
should be played by the grand jury. Of the three investigations
which were carried out, the one performed by the Portage County
grand jury became the most important because twenty-five criminal
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indictments were issued therefrom; individual rights and liberties
were involved. The two federal investigations were, therefore, somewhat dwarfed in importance. This should not have been the case.
Under the proposals outlined above, the county grand jury investigation would have been no more authoritative than the other two
and would have served a similar function to the one conducted by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In other words, both the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Portage County grand jury
would have reported back to their respective executive superiors,
the United States Department of Justice and the Portage County
Prosecutor. To the discretion of these executive authorities, then,
any decision to prosecute would have been reserved. Thus, the decision to prosecute would have lain with the Portage County Prosecutor initially and not with the grand jury, instead of forcing him,
as the news media reported, to prosecute a handful of the Kent State
defendants and only later allowing him to drop the charges against
the rest.
If the investigatory powers of the grand jury are to be retained
and intensified, it is necessary that the grand jury be given adequate
resources with which to employ its own investigative staff. The prosecutor's office, in its new role of sole accuser, would direct its staff
in the realm of criminal investigation only, and would probably
have neither the time nor manpower to provide investigators for
the grand jury. Furthermore, if the grand jury is to routinely inquire into the operation of governmental offices, specifically the
prosecutor's, a totally impartial investigation could not be expected
if the staff employed by the grand jury were to come from the
prosecutor's office itself.
Finally, it is recommended that laws be enacted or existing
statutes be amended by both the Congress and state legislatures
which would provide for a "blue ribbon" list of prospective grand
jurors who possess the individual qualifications necessary to perform competent investigations. The use of such a list need not
violate the Constitution as being discriminatory, if safeguards are
included in the legislation which would assure that compilation of
the list itself be both racially and politically unbiased. In addition,
actual selection of jurors from the "blue ribbon" list could still be
accomplished randomly and apportion representation among all
groups in the community.
Timothy G. Kasparekt
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